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Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply
Against Private Actors?
By JENNIFER FRIESEN*
The idea that constitutional rights may be an appropriate means to
regulate relations between private entities and persons is a persistent one.
Thirty years ago, for example, law reviews seriously urged that corporate
power should be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 This notion
never caught on in federal constitutional law, but it has now begun to
resurface amid the state bills of rights revival. The time is right for a
serious new look at the idea of "constitutionalizing" the private sector.
Governmental entities in the 1980s increasingly call for privatization, or
subcontracting, of some of their traditional functions. States, counties,
and school districts contract for private jails, for residential care of dis-
abled indigents, and for special education for children unable to function
in public schools. Litigators are directed to private judges or arbitrators
and private schools now educate a huge proportion of the children who
formerly attended public school, especially in congested urban areas. As
more of government's traditional functions pass into private hands, ques-
tions about abuse of power and accountability will be raised. At the
same time, the increasing wealth and power of corporations and other
businesses over individuals makes those questions live ones even as ap-
plied to the established private sector.
The question whether to apply constitutional restraints on private
actors is without doubt a difficult and controversial one, but adopting
two assumptions makes it more manageable. First, the question can be
approached, if at all, only by reference to the text, history, and purpose
of individual clauses of the California Declaration of Rights. It must be
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Kansas, 1972; J.D., Ore-
gon, 1978.
1. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L.
REV. 1539 (1960); Berle, Constitutional Limits on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952). The idea has
forceful contemporary proponents as well. See Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 503, 506 (1985).
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answered separately for each clause, not generally for the entire constitu-
tion. Second, the question cannot be answered by invoking current fed-
eral fourteenth amendment "state action" doctrine-a beast of a doctrine
which, though it cannot be made to behave justly or even predictably, is
supposed by orthodox theory to save us from even worse horrors.' The
federal state action doctrine is not a good model for California law. Its
staying power is attributable primarily to the text and history of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as to concerns of federalism. If Califor-
nia courts interpreting state law similarly believe it appropriate to limit
the reach of the constitution, they should do so only for independent,
state purposes consistent with California history and text.
The question narrows even more if we set aside certain instances
when, most would agree, protecting constitutional-type rights in the pri-
vate sector is perfectly appropriate. Constitutional rights have never
been the sole domain of supreme court judges. No one finds it particu-
larly controversial that local governments and state legislatures can act
to promote constitutional values by regulating the conduct of private citi-
zens and organizations. Existing statutory law significantly shrinks the
sphere in which the constitution might be called on directly to protect
minority rights. Laws against invidious discrimination in housing, em-
ployment, and credit are obvious examples, but free speech and privacy
interests are also secured by state and federal statutes protecting on-the-
job whistle blowers, prohibiting lie detector tests in employment, or
prohibiting retaliation against labor organizers. The true debate over
whether constitutional rights can be asserted against private actors con-
cerns whether judges should take that step themselves, unaided by
statute.
This debate has begun to generate published commentary,3 much of
2. The federal state action doctrine is said to be necessary to preserve for private actors
an essential sphere of autonomy from federal governmental (primarily judicial) interference.
Nonintervention by the government, though, preserves only the autonomy of the more power-
ful participant in the private transaction; it does nothing for the least powerful whose auton-
omy interests (e.g., free speech or equality) are diminished or destroyed. As Clyde Summers
states in regard to its effect on free speech, "The judicially drawn line between state action and
private action privatizes control over speech with no corresponding privatization of personal
freedom." Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy:
Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 690. This objection is also made in
detail by Professor Chemerinsky. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1. The arguments of other
critics are noted in Professor Sundby's Commentary, Is Abandoning State Action Asking too
Much of the Constitution?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 139, 140 n.3 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Margulies, A Terrible Beauty: Functional State Action Analysis and State
Constitutions, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 723 (1988) (functional state analysis is both attractive and
repellant in that it lends itself to judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights); Skover,
The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action,
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it provoked by the celebrated shopping mall access cases,4 but also by
concerns with private employment.' Some writers, and some judges,
freely answer "sometimes" to the question whether to apply constitu-
tional restraints on private actors; a few have speculated about the more
difficult question of "when?" 6 Most of those answering "no" (at times
"absolutely not!") are, understandably, judges. Two articulate judges on
the Washington Supreme Court have taken up this debate in law re-
views,7 but most have expressed themselves in published opinions.' On
the other hand, a respectable body of case law, particularly in California,
8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 221 (1985) (proposing dismantlement of Washington "state ac-
tion" doctrine and recognition of justiciability of controversies involving competing private
claims of state constitutional liberties).
4. See, eg., Margulies, supra note 3; Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Ac-
cess to Private Property Under State Constitutional Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 51 (B. McGraw ed. 1985) (discussing increased reliance on state
constitutional law for claims regarding access to private property by those wishing to engage in
political speech); Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and "State Action" The View of the
Framers, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 445 (1986) (constitutional rights are guaranteed only
against infringement by state or by private entities engaged in "state action"; individuals must
look to legislation for protection from infringement by private entities pursuing private inter-
ests); Utter, The Right to Speak Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional Protection
Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 157 (1985) (Washington Constitu-
tion intended to protect free speech rights against abridgement by private individuals and orga-
nizations); Note, Free Speech, Initiative, and Property Rights in Conflict-Four Alternatives to
the State Action Requirement in Washington, 58 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1983) (direct balancing
and traditional public function doctrine are the appropriate approaches for courts to take in
deciding the scope of free speech rights in shopping mall cases); Ragosta, Free Speech Access to
Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. I
(1986); Hardy, Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Mailing" of Consti-
tutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1983); Note, State-Guaranteed Right to Speak in Pri-
vately Owned Shopping Centers, 94 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1980); Note, Private Abridgement of
Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980) (free speech guarantees of state
constitutions are appropriate vehicles for protection of public forum and canvassing rights).
5. See, eg., Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for
Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42, 60-66 (1987) (state constitution can be used to "circum-
vent" federal state action requirement); Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State
Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522 (1982) (free speech provisions in state constitutions provide
means to protect speech).
6. For example, Professor Levinson, supra note 4, proposes a balancing type of inquiry
to draw the line between the interests of the two competing private parties. Some judges tem-
porize, requiring some showing of government or government-like involvement to invoke the
state constitutional right, but accepting "less" than would be required to make out a four-
teenth amendment violation. See, e.g., Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 896
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (former employee's wrongful discharge claim under Texas free speech
clause; hospital would be treated as public entity for purpose of upholding state constitution,
given its demonstrated involvement with various state and federal governmental agencies).
This approach, though, recreates many of the difficulties of the federal state action doctrine,
thus inviting much fairly pointless litigation regarding whether an entity is sufficiently "gov-
ernmental," with low predictability of results.
7. See Dolliver supra note 4; Utter, supra note 4.
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endorses the argument that state constitutions are not limited in their
reach to governmental actors. Without extending their holdings much
beyond each individual dispute, judges in California and elsewhere have
allowed plaintiffs to assert constitutional challenges against private prop-
erty owners who allegedly interfered with distribution of literature or so-
licitation of support for political aims,9 private university officials who
compromised rights of privacy by disclosing sensitive information, 10 doc-
tors and others who interfered with the operation of a clinic because it
performed elective abortions,' doctors who refused medical treatment to
those who complained to a watchdog agency about the quality of care at
a community hospital,12 and an investor-owned utility that denied homo-
sexuals equal job opportunity. 3
Taking a cue from these cases, one might begin the present discus-
sion with this hypothesis 4 : Unless the text or history of a particular
8. State courts in the following cases rejected claims of access to private property to
conduct political activities, in the absence of a showing of "state action": Jacobs v. Major, 139
Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign
v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986); Woodland v. Michigan
Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall,
66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192
Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981). Contra
infra note 9.
In an employment related drug testing case, the Alaska court has declared that the state's
1972 privacy clause does not govern private action, in the absence of language in the amend-
ment or a demonstrated intent to reach private actors. Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling,
Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). Texas courts of appeals have held that the Texas Equal
Rights Amendment does not forbid purely private discrimination. Cedillo v. Ewlin Enter-
prises, 744 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (state
elections clause shields political activity in private shopping center); Alderwood Assocs. v.
Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (plurality opinion) (initia-
tive petitioners in shopping mall); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981)
(private university); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (leafletting at Princeton
University); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 477 U.S. 74 (1980) (political petitioners in shopping mall).
10. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976)
(applying California privacy guarantee, CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1, to private university).
11. Chico Feminist Women's Health Center. v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp.
1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (applying California privacy clause).
12. Leach v. Drummond Medical Group, 144 Cal. App. 3d, 362, 192 Cal. Rptr. 650
(1983) (applying California petition clause, CAL. CONST., art. I, § 3, to private medical group).
13. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (applying California equal protection clause, CAL. CONST. art I, § 7(a));
see also Rojo v. Kliger, 209 Cal. App. 3d 10, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166-67 (1989) (noting in a
wrongful discharge action that CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 had banned sex discrimination by pri-
vate employers since 1879).
14. Although Professor Sundby is skeptical about, as he puts it, "abandoning state ac-
tion," he does not advocate that these existing California precedents be overruled. Sundby, Is
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clause requires it, the California Declaration of Rights should not be in-
terpreted to forbid only infringements of those rights by state and local
governments. Any natural person who suffers an interference with one
of those declared rights should be able to state a complaint against the
actor responsible, even though the defendant can be characterized as
merely a private person or organization.
Three main objections to this hypothesis appear in the literature and
in state judges' opinions."5 The chief objection to allowing the constitu-
tion into the private sector is that it would impose undesirable, perhaps
even immoral, limits on the liberty of private actors. An often used ex-
ample is that without a limiting principle like state action, householders
would be forced to integrate their dinner parties or open their living
rooms to political protesters. Similarly, doctors would be unable to pre-
vent anti-abortion demonstrators from occupying their clinic waiting
rooms, and a woman could be sued for sex discrimination if she deliber-
ately chose a man instead of a woman (or vice versa) as a spouse or living
companion.
But these examples are absurd. To say that the Declaration of
Rights may limit private conduct does not mean that standards devel-
oped for government actors can be automatically applied with full
strength to private actors. The proper accommodation of the competing
rights and interests of private individuals is, as in ordinary tort litigation,
for state judges to decide. Private defendants in constitutional suits may
assert justifications for their conduct that the government cannot as-
sert-for example, their own privacy, property, associational, or speech
rights. The court simply will be obliged to decide whether the justifica-
tion is adequate. Whether the court calls its process "balancing," or
something else, the question in each case will be whose autonomy-the
defendant's or the plaintiff's-most merits protection. There is little
doubt, for example, that in each of the above extreme hypotheticals, the
rights claimants (the uninvited guest, the abortion protestor, and the dis-
appointed lover), would lose their constitutional claim on the merits, and
that the privacy, property, and association rights of the defendant house-
holder, the doctor and patients, and the spouse-to-be would be crucial to
this outcome.
abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
139.
15. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982); Marshall, Diluting ConstitutionalRights: Rethinking
"Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 558 (1985) (a reply to Chemerinsky, supra note
1); Dolliver, supra note 4; see cases cited supra note 8.
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Thus, the autonomy of defendants can be preserved, when it ought
to be preserved, by a decision on the merits rather than by avoiding an
open accommodation through use of a state action concept."6 Eliminat-
ing this formalistic barrier to adjudication says nothing about whether
any particular defendant will be liable, but only ensures that, at least in
the beginning, more complaints will be heard. Simply stated, this view of
the Declaration of Rights would create the foundation for a new body of
state tort law, touching a new class of defendants. The increased
caseload and line drawing problems this would create for state judge
should not be discounted. The state courts unlikely would be flooded
with novel cases. Line drawing of this type is a problem that common-
law judges are well equipped to handle.
A second common objection to doing away with conventional state
action analysis rests on tradition. This argument asserts that to apply
constitutional guarantees in disputes between private parties wrongly de-
fies settled expectations, for it is the essential nature of constitutions that
they are meant to restrain only government. The appeal to tradition and
settled expectations has a strong attraction, and has been accepted by
state judges in New York and Wisconsin, among others.17 In other states,
including California, judicial decisions are not yet as encumbered with
sweeping a priori assumptions about the "nature" of constitutional
rights.
A third objection is that the expansion of constitutional rights to the
private sector is antidemocratic."i Abandonment of a formalistic "state
action" requirement exalts the power of unrepresentative courts at the
expense of a representative legislature. The substance of this objection
cannot be denied. If courts declare constitutional rights in actions
against private actors, the legislature might be to that extent unable to
declare a different allocation of rights. Nevertheless, the force of this
objection is easily exaggerated. First, the legislature retains the power to
limit and structure remedies for these rights, as Congress has done for
fourteenth amendment based rights.19 Second, the electorate in Califor-
16. Some scholars have made a persuasive case for this direct approach even to disputes
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 506. The direct ap-
proach has also been called "functional analysis" to distinguish it from the diversionary and
impossible task of divining "state action" using the orthodox United States Supreme Court
formula. Margulies, supra note 3, at 725.
17. See supra note 8; infra note 44.
18. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 15, at 566-67.
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1981) (providing for damages, equitable relief, and attor-
neys fees for loss of rights secured by the United States Constitution). As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, § 1983 is subject to numerous defenses and immunities. See, eg., Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (no respondeat superior liability for city);
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nia retains significant democratic power over the confent of the Declara-
tion of Rights, and over the identity of members of the bench. Third, if,
as a matter of policy, constitutional interests like speech and privacy are
thought to need protection against private invasion, entrusting them to
the courts and inhibiting (without preventing) democratic diminution of
such rights is appropriate.
For purposes of illustration, this Article will refer mostly to Califor-
nia's privacy clause, to the opening section of its free speech guarantee,
and to its related guarantee of the right to petition the government. Be-
cause these interests are important to almost everyone and often are un-
protected by statute against private abridgement, z0 they are more likely
than others to generate substantial civil litigation against private parties.
This Article also focuses on privacy, speech, and petition because of their
texts."1 None of them is explicitly directed solely to official conduct.22
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity for officers); Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (states cannot be sued under § 1983).
20. There are exceptions. See, e.g., California's whistle-blowing statute, CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1102.5 (West 1987) (no employer shall retaliate against an employee for disclosing to a gov-
ernment agency information showing possible violation of law); see also CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1102 (no employer shall coerce employees because of employee's political activity).
21. Section I states: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
Section 2(a) states: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a)
Section 3 states: "The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition
government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
22. Other sections of the Declaration easily can be read as capable of being breached by
the interference of private parties. They are § 4, sentence one (free exercise of religion guaran-
teed); § 6 (slavery prohibited); § 8 (disqualification from a business or profession because of
sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin); § 13 (unreasonable seizures and searches);
§ 20 (property rights of noncitizens); § 25 (right to fish).
Section 7, referring to deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
and denial of equal protection of the laws implies the participation or at least encouragement of
government in a private enterprise, like the monopolistic private utility in Gay Law Students
Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). And
recently the California Supreme Court seems to have taken a harder line in regard to the "state
action" required to trigger the California equal protection clause. See Schmidt v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal. 3d 1060, 742 P.2d 209, 213, 240 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (1987), in which Justice
Mosk states: "It is incontrovertible that the mandate of the equal protection clause applies
only to actions taken, directly or indirectly, by the government itself." But see Rojo v. Kliger,
209 Cal. App. 3d 10, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1989) (suggesting that private employer could violate
public policy advanced by California Constitution's nondisqualification clause, art. I, § 8, even
though discharged employees did not invoke available statutory remedies for sex based job
discrimination.)
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In contrast, some of the rights preserved in the California Declaration of
Rights are concededly limitations only on government. Clauses gov-
erning bail,23 punishment,24 and trial by jury2" are obvious examples, as
well as prohibitions on certain kinds of "laws": ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder,26 laws respecting an establishment of religion, 27 or laws
restraining the freedom of the press.2" This Article addresses those guar-
antees that do not, by text or context, clearly limit their operation to
government.
I. The California Point of View-Speech and Privacy
A. Origins of the Texts
The text of California's speech and privacy guarantees are not
worded so as to govern only public bodies. This aspect of the text stands
in contrast to most of the 1791 Federal Bill of Rights, the Federal Four-
teenth Amendment, and some of our sister states' bills of rights. Califor-
nia's article I, section 1, for example, opens the bill of rights by declaring,
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy." The free speech or "liberty of speech"
clause also declares the existence of a broad affirmative right to speak,
followed by a separate sentence restraining government: "Every person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press."2 9 Third is the right to petition for
redress of grievances: "The people have the right to instruct their repre-
sentatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble
freely to consult for the common good."30
The language of all three clauses, with only one important excep-
tion,31 dates from California's earliest constitution. The delegates to the
23. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
24. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 17.
25. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
26. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
27. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 4.
28. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (second sentence).
29. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2(a).
30. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
31. In 1972, § 1 was amended by initiative to add "privacy" to the end of the list of
inalienable rights and to declare that "all people" possessed these rights, a change from "all
men." White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975).
The liberty of speech clause adopted in 1849 declared it to be the right of "every citizen."
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1849 Constitutional Convention,32 who unanimously approved all three,
did not choose to word them as limits on government. The choice in-
stead to declare the existence of broad and affirmative rights creates at
least an inference that private as well as official interference with these
rights was meant to be barred.
The inference is supported by the convention records. When the
Declaration of Rights was moved and adopted, over several days, inalien-
able rights, liberty of speech, and petition rights provoked little debate or
dissent."3 The debates, which on other provisions are quite detailed,
contain no record of any "original intent" of these delegates in regard to
the private/public distinction.
L The Liberty of Speech and Right to Petition Clauses
The text of the liberty of speech clause was borrowed virtually un-
changed from the New York Constitution.34 The choice of affirmative
rather than restrictive language might have been fortuitous,35 but the dis-
tinction between the two structures may have been known and appreci-
ated. The fourteen attorneys in the delegation would have known that
Subsequent amendments expanded this class to "every person" desiring to express "his or her"
sentiments. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
32. California's 48 delegates to Monterey originally haled from 15 states in addition to
California. Among the delegation were fourteen attorneys, as well as merchants, farmers,
army officers, a banker, a physician, a printer, a surveyor, a "labrador" (laborer), and the
mysterious Mr. B. F. Moore, lately of Texas, who listed his profession as "elegant leisure." J.
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMA-
TION OF THE STATE CONsTrrUTIoN 478-79 (1850). Many delegates were recent immigrants
to California; over half had resided in California three years or less, a quarter for a year or less.
Only six lifelong Californians served as constitutional delegates, all of them Spanish surnamed
men who had been born in California. Id.
33. Id, at 34 (inalienable rights section approved as § 1); id. at 41 (free speech clause
adopted as section 8 without debate); id. at 42 (right to assemble and petition approved, in
form borrowed from the Iowa Constitution).
In fact, Mr. Botts, an attorney and delegate from Monterey, objected to inclusion of § 1
only on the grounds that it was superfluous: "It merely secures to the citizens of the State
certain privileges, of which this Convention has no power to deprive them. It is only by their
own act that they can be legally dispossessed of those privileges." Id. at 34. Mr. Semple, a
printer and representative from Sonoma, responded that this article was "an essential principle
to be incorporated in a bill of rights. It takes precedence of all others, and places those that
follow it in a higher point of view. He trusted it would be retained." It was. The question was
taken and the section adopted without further debate. Id.
34. Id. at 31. The general format was commonplace, however. In fact, about 43 state
constitutions still contain a similar affirmatively phrased right to speak freely. See Halbert,
The First Amendment in the Workplace, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42, 61 n.138 (1987); Note,
Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522 (1982).
35. Ten delegates were from New York. The prestige of New York law owing to the
prominence of Mr. David Dudley Field and the recent Field Code may have led to the choice
of New York law. J. BROWNE, supra note 32, at 478-79.
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the Federal First Amendment furnished a competing model, one that
restrained only government. Second, minutes of the debates reveal one
instance in which the delegation was presented with a clear choice be-
tween a restrictive and affirmative form of guarantee and chose the af-
firmative wording.36 This choice concerned the right of petition and
assembly clause that came up for debate immediately after the adoption
of New York's free speech clause.
The petition clause as originally proposed stated, "No law shall be
passed abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government." Mr. Botts, a Virginia attorney, objected to the
humiliating notion that a sovereign people must "petition" for their just
demands. Three other attorneys-Mr. Ord, Mr. Shannon, and Mr.
Jones-joined the debate. Shortly thereafter the assembly adopted a dif-
ferent version, attributed to the Iowa Constitution. It read, "The people
shall have the right freely to assemble together to consult for the com-
mon good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature
for redress of grievances." 37 The minutes do not reveal why the delegates
chose to declare an open-ended right rather than simply to prohibit op-
pressive "laws," as the original proposal had done. Perhaps the delegates
preferred it for its grander and more sweeping style; or perhaps that style
was more attractive precisely because it secured a precious liberty against
the entire world.
Roughly contemporaneous evidence from our sister states on the
West Coast also lends modest support for the conclusion that California
delegates understood the difference between a clause that, on its face,
binds "all the world" and one that binds only government. Oregon citi-
zens, who drafted their first constitution in 1857, eight years after Monte-
rey, rejected the open format of the California and New York free speech
clauses, and chose instead to borrow from Indiana, where an 1851
amendment had recast that state's speech guarantee from a broad declar-
ative form to a form that was strictly a limit on government.38 If the
broader New York form, by far the overwhelming favorite in the states
that had entered the union by 1857, had been commonly thought by
36. Id. at 42.
37. Id.
38. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 OR. L. REv. 200, 201 (1926). Ore-
gon's version, adopted in 1857, still reads, "No law shall be passed restraining the free expres-
sion of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." OR. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
Indiana's original free speech clause was, in 1816, worded much like the open declaration
favored by New York and most other states, But, intriguingly, Indiana amended it in 1851 to
provide, "No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but for the abuse
['Vol. 17:111
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West Coast lawyers and politicians to be directed only to government,
there is no easy explanation, except perhaps an excess of caution, for
Oregon's choice to make that limit explicit. Nor did Oregon prove to be
a trend setter in free speech clauses. When the delegates to the Washing-
ton constitutional convention took up the same debate in 1889, they
chose the California and New York models, deliberately rejecting an
early draft drawn from the Oregon version.39
Still, these arguments drawn from the text are not conclusive. The
text plausibly can be read as directed only to government interference.
First, as noted above, California's speech clause does, after declaring the
existence of the right, go on to prohibit any "law" that restrains or
abridges liberty of speech. Adding this prohibition on oppressive laws
might mean that, although the delegates wished to declare generally the
sanctity of free expression, they feared only government intrusions. In
this respect, the structure of the clause bears a strong resemblance to the
Federal Fourth Amendment.' In both clauses, the declared right may
be read as secured only against the specified invasion (for instance, legal
restraints on speech, or unsupported warrants), or as secured only
against the specified invader (for instance, governments, which pass laws
and issue warrants). Of course, the Fourth Amendment is consistently
read in this latter way, to bind only the official arms of government. But
the California speech clause, at least, has not been interpreted so
of that right every person shall be responsible." IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; see 3 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 364-65, 378-79 (W. Swindler ed. 1974).
In addition to Oregon and Indiana, four more states presently phrase their free speech
guarantees exclusively as a limitation on government. They are Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; South Carolina, S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; Utah, UTAH CONsT. art. I, § 15; and West Vir-
ginia, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7. All four use a model similar to the Federal First Amend-
ment, i.e., that "no law" shall abridge freedom of speech.
39. Utter, supra note 4, at 172-77.
40. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
California's counterpart is virtually identical:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may
not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. With unimportant exceptions, this text has remained unchanged
since its adoption in the 1849 Convention. Its immediate source was probably the Fourth
Amendment. J. BROWNE, supra note 32, at 48.
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narrowly.41
Section 2(a)'s interesting limiting phrase, "being responsible for the
abuse of the right," might also shed some light on the private/public
issue. Responsibility for abuse of the right to speak was almost certainly
meant to preserve common-law defamation actions, which might other-
wise be eradicated by the broad protective language of the guarantee. 42
If this is so, then the corollary would be that if speech is not abusive, it
should not be suppressed by a private suit for injunctive or damage relief.
This, then, is evidence of awareness that the constitution could not only
shield conduct (nondefamatory speech) from civil liability, but also limit
other private conduct (damage suits for nondefamatory speech). True,
the United States Supreme Court has conceded that judicial enforcement
of common law defamation actions satisfies "state action." 3 But the "re-
sponsibility for abuse" phrase was adopted in California nearly 100 years
earlier. At the very least, its inclusion in 1849 supports the argument
that the document's drafters, or borrowers, did not have a fixed notion
that only the conduct of public actors could be affected by constitutional
guarantees.
2. Inalienable Rights and Privacy
The historical record, then, does not clearly support a narrow read-
ing of section 2(a), the free speech clause. A narrow reading is even less
appropriate for section 1, the inalienable rights section.
41. For example, owners of some kinds of commercial private property, in addition to
shopping mall owners, must respect the rights of individuals to distribute literature on their
premises, at least so long as the ordinary conduct of business is not disrupted. See, e-g., Robins
v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd,
477 U.S. 74 (1980) (free speech and petition provisions of California Constitution protect
speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, even when shopping center is privately owned);
Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1982) (owner of common areas in a private residential community unconstitutionally deprived
plaintiff's free speech and free press rights by denying plaintiff access afforded to rival pub-
lisher).
On the other hand, New York, whose bill of rights furnished the original text of Califor-
nia's speech clause in 1849, has since interpreted the same language to require proof of conven-
tional state action. See Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211,
498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985) (political demonstrators could be banned from distributing leaflets in
privately owned shopping mall, absent allegation that state action was involved).
42. See, e.g., Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 391, 64 N.E. 163, 165 (1902)
(interpreting similar language; slander and libel are abuses of the state constitutional right of
free speech and speaker may be sued civilly, but is not subject to prior restraint); Wheeler v.
Green, 286 Or. 99, 118, 593 P.2d 777, 788 (1979) ("Defamatory statements, of course, have
throughout the history of this state been recognized as an abuse of the right of free expression
for which a person is to be held responsible under the provisions of Article I, § 8 [of the
Oregon Constitution].").
43. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Because the concept of inalienable rights itself transports us to the
realm of political philosophy, it creates a sensible context in which to
address the traditional objection mentioned above-that constitutional
rights were never meant to protect against merely private conduct. This
argument holds that California's convention delegates could not have in-
tended private actors to be bound because regulation of rights between
private parties was not conceived, in the nineteenth century, to be a valid
constitutional purpose. Private relations were left to the common law of
contracts, or torts, or property, or to the developing codes. Constitutions
were meant to constrain newly created state governments, so that the bill
of rights in the state charter served the same function, and solely the
same function, as the 1791 Federal Bill of Rights, to preserve civil liber-
ties from a potentially tyrannical government.' In order for this argu-
ment to succeed, its proponents would have to convince state courts that,
at least on this fundamental character of the Bill of Rights, "framers'
intent" must be respected. A limiting principle must be implied where
not explicit in the text.
Without entering the fray over the proper weight to be assigned to
even discoverable framers' intent, the opening section of California's ear-
liest constitution may be evidence of a different historical intent than the
one advanced by this traditional argument. Whatever the subsequent di-
rection taken by constitutional theory, section 1 is evidence that Califor-.
nia's pioneer legal architects believed that people possessed natural
rights.45 Section 1 is a conventional natural law formula, a philosophy
that, in the United States, achieved the peak of its popularity in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. When the delegates began with a decla-
ration that "all men are by nature" possessed of "inalienable rights" with
respect to life, liberty, and property, they dipped into a tradition of polit-
ical philosophy that earlier gave shape to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.46 For our purposes the questions raised by section 1 are first,
44. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has stated, "[T]his fundamental con-
cept [of state action] concerning the reach of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights is
not only deeply rooted in constitutional tradition, it is at the foundation of the very nature of a
constitutional democracy." Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 488
N.E.2d 1211, 1215, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1985); accord Dolliver, supra note 4.
45. Again, the only debate that Mr. Browne recorded in connection with section 1 is
instructive. Mr. Botts, an attorney delegate, argued that section 1 was unnecessary: "It
merely secures to the citizens of the State certain privileges, of which this Convention has no
power to deprive them. It is only by their own act that they can be legally dispossessed of
those privileges." J. BROWNE, supra note 32, at 34.
46. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776):
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are
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whether such language was meant to be enforceable by means of a law-
suit and second, whether calling the rights of people inalienable and nat-
ural adds anything to the debate about whether its sponsors meant only
government was bound to respect them.
Modem theorists could question whether this section was, even in
1849, meant to embody concrete rights enforceable by courts against
anyone in particular, as opposed to declaring a philosophy of government
for the legislature and the people.47 In light of the European and early
American tradition of declaring the existence of inalienable rights in doc-
uments unsuited or unintended to serve as premises for judicial enforce-
ment, the inclusion of natural rights in the body of the state constitution
creates an enigma. For, by 1849, judicial review of American constitu-
tional rights was accepted and expected, and the specific rights in the
sections following section 1 were clearly meant to be enforceable in court.
Compounding this convergence of natural law and positivism is the
1972 addition of "privacy" to section 1. While it might once have been
plausible to treat section 1 as merely precatory language declaring a gen-
eral philosophy and not as a guarantee of substantive rights, that position
is undermined by the 1972 initiative amendment declaring "privacy" as
one of the enumerated inalienable rights. There is no question that pri-
vacy was meant to be enforced, indeed enforced even against private ac-
tors, and California courts are unanimous in treating it so.4"
Even disregarding the modem addition of privacy, however, section
1 may be viewed more modestly as only an aid to interpreting the scope
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed
47. Continental European nations commonly included similar declarations of rights in
their basic charters. However, these constitutions often did not provide for judicial review
even of governmental acts that transgressed these declared rights. In this type of legal culture,
such declarations are obviously not meant to serve as a basis for a lawsuit. See generally M.
CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
48. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975)
(enjoining police surveillance of university classes; constitutional provision guaranteeing pri-
vacy is self-executing and confers a judicial right of action on all Californians); Porten v. Uni-
versity of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976) (permitting
damage suit against private school for disclosure of student records; privacy is protected not
merely against state action, but is an inalienable right that may not be violated by anyone).
The California Supreme Court has relied heavily on statements in the official viters' pam-
phlet promoting passage of the privacy amendment as evidence of the intent behind the
amendment. These statements identified the chief mischiefs at which the amendment was di-
rected as the collecting and use, by both government and business, of personal information.
White, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106. No such detailed evidence of
intent is available for the earliest version of § 1.
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of concrete, particular rights that follow.4 9 Were they to apply to private
conduct? Natural law adherents believed that rights were inherent; to
say that they were "inalienable" as well means that they were thought
"beyond the scope of governmental power to control or the free human
being to surrender."5 If early Californians treated rights as natural and
inalienable, there is no reason to believe that private interference with
them was viewed as any more acceptable than official interference. 1
3. Modern Translations: Twentieth Century Pioneering in California
Constitutional Law
In the end, though, perhaps the most we can say about the text and
history of the Declaration is that by adopting open, affirmative state-
ments of rights, the drafters simply left open the question of who must
respect those rights. The text does not compel a finding that private par-
ties are bound; it only creates an opportunity to do so.52 When the lan-
guage is unclear, modem judges are required to make a choice that
remains true to the aspirations actually expressed in the text, while also
bringing ancient language to bear on unforeseen modem analogues to the
original evil that prompted it. 3 To make this choice, a natural question
49. When this article was proposed, Mr. Semple, a printer and representative from So-
noma, California, argued that it was "an essential principle to be incorporated in a bill of
rights. It takes precedence of all others, and places those that follow it in a higher point of
view." J. BROWNE, supra note 32, at 34.
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1309-10.
51. This argument did not help the rights claimant in a recent Wisconsin shopping mall
access case. Justice Steinmetz disposed of an inherent rights/natural law argument by saying:
The defendants argue there are inherent rights coming from God or nature
which existed, therefore, prior to the very idea of a Wisconsin Declaration of Rights
Defendants then come to the conclusion that if such rights have any meaning,
they must apply as against one's fellow human beings. This they say is true since a
right which, because it is inherent, exists prior to the institution of any government,
cannot shrink or disappear when a government is established, but retains its full
moral vigor and validity in nongovernmental as well as governmental contexts....
Carrying this to its logical conclusion produces the absurd result that the right can be
exercised on any property including private property.
Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 526-27, 407 N.W.2d 832, 846 (1987).
52. See Margulies, supra note 3, at 729 (footnotes and citations omitted):
Some courts eschew the thicket of functional analysis altogether. Instead, they sus-
tain the constitutional challenge by relying upon the absence of state action language
in the constitutional text [citing Pruneyard]. Textual analysis of this kind may be the
path of least resistance for judges unwilling to grapple with the complexities of func-
tionalism, but in the final analysis it is not always convincing, for there may be other
reasons why no state action language appears. The omission, in other words, does
not necessarily evince an intent to apply constitutional guarantees to private parties.
It merely supplies an opportunity.
53. Justice Shirley Abrahamson used this principle to argue, unsuccessfully, that a shop-
ping mall in Wisconsin should have to permit a political dance:
Protection of speech against nongovernmental interference is consistent with the
intentions of the framers and electors adopting [the Wisconsin free speech clause].
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is whether concentrated private power threatens the values protected by
declared rights in a way fairly analogous to the threat posed by unlimited
government power.54
Judges deciding privacy cases in California do not need to struggle
with this question of evolutionary interpretation because the voters un-
disputedly intended to apply that portion of the constitution in the pri-
vate sector. 5  On the different question of access to public forums, the
shopping mall speech cases clearly have taken an evolutionary tack by
recognizing that the replacement of public streets and sidewalks with en-
closed malls has the potential of abridging the right to speak freely. It
would be equally true to the text and spirit of the 1849 constitution to
Judge Robert H. Bork, a distinguished proponent of the jurisprudence of original
intent, has explained that, in order to be true to the original intent of the framers, the
modem judge must apply the general principle on which the framers agreed to cir-
cumstances which the framers could not have dreamed of. "A judge who refuses to
deal with unforeseen threats to an established constitutional value, and hence pro-
vides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair, and reasonable
meaning, fails in his judicial duty." Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823, 827 (1986).
Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 535-36, 407 N.W.2d at 850 (Abrahamson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. Thus, in the same shopping mall case, Justice Abrahamson would have concluded
that, by "restraining political speech... and asserting a right to control and orchestrate speech
in these new centers of community life these nongovernmental entities present a threat analo-
gous to the specific threat identified by the framers of the Wisconsin Constitution" in the
second half of the clause, which explicitly forbids laws that interfere with speech. 139 Wis. 2d
at 537, 407 N.W.2d at 851. Justice Steinmetz, writing for the majority, was not swayed:
This court has the power, perhaps the duty, to make sure that the protections of
our state constitution remain relevant in light of changing conditions, emerging
needs, and acceptable changes in social values, but such action must be consistent
with the clear meaning of the constitution. However, this cannot be "made an excuse
for imposing the individual beliefs and philosophies of the judges upon other
branches of government .. "
Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 520, 407 N.W.2d at 843-44. On his side of the original intent war,
Justice Steinmetz cited Raoul Berger, George Deukmejian, and Professor Thayer. Id. (quoting
B. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 91 (1921)). Justice Abrahamson's rejoin-
der: "The personal preference of the judge should no more be used to read rights out of the
constitution than it should be used to read rights into the constitution." Id. at 541, 407
N.W.2d at 853. As for any question raised by the text itself, Justice Steinmetz thought that
Wisconsin's article I, § 3 (which is almost identical to California's free speech clause) had such
a "plain meaning" that applying it to private conduct was not only wrong, but, in all serious-
ness, unthinkable:
We need go no further than holding that Art. I, see. 3 has plain, unambiguous mean-
ing that free speech is protected constitutionally [exclusively] against state interfer-
ence. There cannot be a different understanding of Art. I, sec. 3 by reasonable
persons and therefore there is no ambiguity. Whether language of a statute or consti-
tutional provision is clear or ambiguous depends on the mind-set of the reader.
Thus, two persons or groups can each have a different concept of the same words
both reasonable but only one correct.
Id. at 504, 407 N.W.2d at 837.
55. See supra note 48.
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recognize that, in the late twentieth century, threats to the complete en-
joyment of freedom of speech and to privacy from other private entities
are as serious as threats from elected and appointed officials. The ranch-
ers, farmers, and miners of 1849 did not yet live in a world where the
overwhelming majority of Californians are dependent on wages for their
living and live in rented housing, often in areas where decent housing and
employment are in short supply. Indeed, we spend most of our lives at
school, or at jobs, or in our apartments. Employers and landlords,
among others, 56 possess, and some will inevitably use, their significant
economic power to prevent unwanted speech or to invade privacy, or to
deny equality of opportunity. Both courts and scholars have commented
on this everyday reality.57
At the same time, it would do violence to the text and history of the
Declaration to ignore property rights, also enshrined in section 1. A
place at least as high as liberty in the hierarchy of inalienable rights is
given to "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property."
"All people" who enjoy such rights does not clearly embrace corpo-
rations. And if it does, it can only be assumed that some accommodation
of property with liberty was intended. It may be that, if asked, the peo-
56. Under some circumstances, a private medical group can be sued for damages under
California's "right to petition" clause, without the need to show "state action." Leach v.
Drummond Medical Group, 144 Cal. App. 3d 362, 192 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1983). The defendants
in that case were providers of medical services who refused to continue to treat the plaintiffs, in
retaliation for the plaintiffs' complaint to a government investigating committee about the
health care provided at a community hospital.
57. "The right of free expression is as important lo many people in their personal and
institutional relationships as it is in the narrower 'civil liberties' related to politics, and nothing
in [Oregon's free expression guarantee] suggests that it is limited to the latter." State v. Rob-
ertson, 293 Or. 402, 435, 649 P.2d 569, 589 (1981). "Unions and corporations have an impor-
tance in our lives which the founding fathers would have thought possible only of government
itself." Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action" 70 YALE
L.J. 345, 348 (1961). "[T]he state has itself immunized [the private utility] from many of the
checks of free market competition and has placed the utility in a position from which it can
yield enormous power over an individual's employment opportunities." Gay Law Students
Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 472, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22, 595 P.2d 592, 600
(1979); see also White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 106, 533 P.2d 222, 234
(1975) (proponents of successful privacy amendment argued in election brochure that "[t]he
proliferation of government and business records over which we have no control limits our
ability to control our personal lives").
Professor Sundby does not deny the enormous economic power of the private establish-
ment, see Sundby, supra note 2, at 142-43 nn.7 & 8, but argues that the government possesses
even more power to affect citizens' lives and that state action is therefore "not an irrational
line," id., at 143. Even if he is correct about the greater degree of power possessed by "govern-
ment," the argument should also consider the checks against abuse of that power. Potential
government abuse is arguably less likely because-it is restrained by the need to be politically
accountable to the press, the voters, and appointing authorities. Private power, privately exer-
cised, is removed from all direct political restraints, short of corrective legislation.
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ple of California would decide that a corporation should be free to dis-
charge its employees for exercise of what we call "free speech," even in
cases in which the employee was competently performing his or her job.
Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. No controlled studies indicate
whether the public is aware that the Federal Bill of Rights does not pro-
tect them against their private employers; however, years of teaching
constitutional rights to law students have convinced this author58 that a
significant percentage of even this relatively sophisticated population is
surprised by this legal truism. Specifically in regard to employment, one
study conducted in Nebraska showed that only a small fraction (ranging,
according to age group, from eight to twenty-two percent) of people
knew that employers generally have the right to fire an employee without
cause connected to the employee's performance.59 By a large majority,
the respondents in this study believed that such terminations were uneth-
ical and believed that laws should be passed to prohibit them. Of course,
that is hardly evidence that the people would want such rules to be con-
stitutionalized. But where such laws are not passed, private employees
and tenants, among others, will predictably seek to invoke the fair proce-
dures and freedom of expression apparently promised in the constitution.
B. Constitutional Torts
This important objection remains: What precedent or justification
exists for casting such rights against private entities in a constitutional
form rather than legislative or nonconstitutional common-law processes,
where adjustment of private party relations ordinarily takes place?
If relief against private conduct is available under the Declaration of
Rights, plaintiffs alleging infringement of speech and privacy will seek
damages based on a tort theory. These suits would present a classic case
for tort liability. The duty element of the tort is supplied by the constitu-
tion; state judges would decide whether that duty had been breached,
what defenses or immunities were available, and whether damages or at-
torney fees for prevailing parties were available. A major consequence of
permitting such claims would be to make of the state Declaration of
Rights a new "font of tort law."6 These new torts would not displace
existing common-law torts like wrongful discharge and invasion of pri-
vacy, but would often overlap with them.
58. Accord Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
59. Forbes & Jones, A Comparative, Attitudinal,*and Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-
Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165 (1986).-
60. The phrase is from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
(disclaiming that role for federal consitutional law).
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Constitutional torts already are well established in this state and
others. A number of state courts have been asked to allow a cause of
action in tort for violation of state constitutional rights. Most states that
have addressed the question do not seem to find it controversial; about
twelve have allowed suits for damages, characterized either as an "im-
plied" cause of action, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics," or simply as a matter of common law.62
Most of these cases have been filed against public agencies. California,
however, has permitted constitutional damage claims against private en-
tities as well as public ones.
63
In addition to direct damage claims, constitutional policies are en-
forced against private actors, without the need to discuss "state action,"
when those policies are absorbed into existing common-law causes of ac-
tion. For example, California courts have a ten year tradition, recently
reaffirmed, of honoring constitutional rights in tort actions for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. As the Supreme Court iterated
last year in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., a private employer may be
sued in tort when an employee's dismissal breaches a public policy "de-
rived from a statute or constitutional provision." 6  Applying this famil-
iar principle, the court of appeal has noted that California's
constitutional prohibition on sex discrimination supported a female
worker's suit against her private employer for discrimination. 65  Simi-
larly, reasoning under the right to petition the government, some Califor-
nia cases have suggested that private employees may enjoy, by means of a
61. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (violation of fourth amendment by federal agent gave rise to
action for damages directly under the Constitution).
62. For a survey of state decisions on this topic, see Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor State
Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1269 (1985). Since 1985, a Texas court of appeals also
has joined the fold in a fairly typical case, a suit brought by an intensive care nurse whose
article on the "right to die" provoked her dismissal by a hospital. After noting the broad,
affirmative nature of most state free speech clauses, the court stated: "We accordingly hold
that article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution constitutes an independent legal basis for a
cause of action claiming an infringement of the right of free speech guaranteed by that section
of the state constitution." Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).
63. See, eg., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (allowing claim for damages against public utility for discrimina-
tion against homosexuals); Rojo v. Kliger, 209 Cal. App. 3d 10, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1989)
(allowing claim for damages against private employer for sexual harassment); Fenton v.
Groveland Community Serv. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 797, 185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1982) (allowing
action against private individuals as well as government for denial of right to vote); Porten v.
University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976) (allowing claim
for damages against private university for invading student's privacy).
64. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 669, 765 P.2d 373, 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1988).
65. Rojo v. Kliger, 209 Cal. App. 3d 10, 24, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166 (1989).
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common-law absorption of constitutional policy, an immunity from dis-
charge or discipline for work-related protests.66
Granting that the state courts have the power to recognize a cause
of action for constitutional deprivations, the question becomes whether
exercise of this power is unwise or improper when the defendant is a
private actor. Of course, the immediate objection is that, unlike ordinary
common-law torts, this theory would create a sort of "super tort," be-
yond the power of the legislature to modify or abolish. At the same time,
it would amplify the power of judges in relation to the legislature. Thus,
it would be antidemocratic; courts should be hesitant to bypass the legis-
lature when the question is "merely" one of regulating relations between
private parties.
This objection is sound, but can be easily overstated. First, to the
extent that we believe the Declaration of Rights promotes interests, like
privacy and freedom of speech that should not be at the mercy of the
democratic give and take of representative politics, or the law of con-
tracts, assignment of their enforcement to the judiciary is appropriate.
Second, the antimajoritarian feature is greatly softened by another con-
stitutional right in California: constitutional amendment by initiative
and referendum. For better or worse, no constitutional right in Califor-
nia is beyond the reach of the electorate if that right proves to be politi-
cally intolerable.
The California Legislature also has the power to shape appropriate
remedies for the violation of constitutional rights. The legislature may, if
it desires, pass statutes regulating the filing of claims, defenses and immu-
nities, amount of damages recoverable, and attorney fees. State tort
claims acts commonly regulate these aspects of tort litigation against
public bodies and officials. Private tort litigation would be equally regul-
able. The California Legislature has modified common-law remedies and
66. See, e.g., Greene v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 26 Cal. 2d 245, 157 P.2d 367 (1945), in
which the court held that an employee's protest of working conditions was not "cause" for
termination of his employment contract. The court stated:
The wisdom and importance of the right to petition is not new. The right of the
governed to petition those exercising the powers of government is secured by the
Constitution of the United States and this state. (U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 10.) The obligations of the employee in the instant case are those
implied in law because considered wise policy. That policy must be applied in the
light of the policy insuring the right to petition.
26 Cal. 2d at 251, 157 P.2d at 370.
Greene was quoted by then Presiding Judge Grodin to support his conclusion that an
employee dismissed for protesting unhealthful work conditions could sue his employer in tort.
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1982). The opinion
also invoked a general public policy of encouraging employee comment on possible violations
of state statutes requiring healthful work places. Id. at 296, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
contingency fee arrangements, for example, with respect to medical mal-
practice claims.67
II. Line Drawing
California has pioneered the terrain of constitutional rights litiga-
tion over private conduct. Largely unexplored, however, is the standard
by which courts should decide when the interests of a private defendant
will prevail, even over assertions of constitutional rights. The difficulty
of this enterprise may be the most powerful objection to commencing it.
Almost everyone who speaks of this accommodation assumes that it
calls for something called balancing. For example, Professor Levinson
writes, in regard to the shopping mall line of cases:
There is no alternative to such balancing once a court decides to
recognize any rights of access to private property. Otherwise, indi-
viduals seeking to speak indeed would have a right to climb over
backyard fences and distribute their literature at family picnics,
and no one seriously argues in behalf of such a right.
68
Most state courts also seem to assume that balancing is the method
of choice, although they disagree about the factors and weights in the
balance. To see how lower courts are coping with line drawing under
such open-ended standards, compare three recent "second wave" lower
court opinions, each from a state whose supreme court generally has pro-
claimed some sort of free speech access rights to private property.
The first is the Washington Court of Appeals opinion in City of Sun-
nyside v. Lopez,69 a case particularly well suited to testing the mettle of
civil libertarians since it concerns free speech rights invoked by an anti-
abortion demonstrator. Ms. Mary Lopez, the demonstrator, tried to
speak to patients and pass out anti-abortion literature on the covered
outdoor "breezeway" immediately surrounding a doctor's offices. The
67. The California Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of
1975 (MICRA), 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949, which made significant changes in medical malpractice
litigation. MICRA requires notice of intent to file suit, modifies statutes of limitations, places
ceilings on recoveries for noneconomic losses, and limits the amount of contingency fees for
which the plaintiff's attorney may contract. MICRA has been sustained by the California
Supreme Court against various state and federal constitutional attacks. See generally Note,
Medical Malpractice and Contingency Fee Controls: Is the Prescription Curing the Crisis or
Killing the Patient?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 623 (1985) (discussing the application of statutory
fee limits in light of first amendment protections afforded attorneys' fees).
68. Levinson, supra note 4, at 54 (footnotes and citations omitted). Professor Margulies
also calls for eliminating the formal search for state action and balancing openly the interests
of speaker and property owner. Margulies, supra note 3, at 730, 736. Professor Sundby like-
wise accepts "balancing" as a description of what judges do in deciding constituional rights.
See Sundby, supra note 2, at 148 n.24.
69. 50 Wash. App. 786, 751 P.2d 313 (1988).
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breezeway was adjacent to the parking lot, but was posted against tres-
passing. She was arrested for trespass when she refused to confine her
activities to the public sidewalk. She claimed a right under the Washing-
ton free speech clause (which is like California's) to free access, at least to
the outdoor portions of the Sunnyside Professional Center. No evidence
indicated that Ms. Lopez's activities interfered in any way with the ordi-
nary use of the breezeways. As Judge Thompson pointed out in his dis-
sent, "She was not impeding access to the center's tenants, nor was she
harassing or verbally abusing potential patients. Her activities were not
found to have financial impact on the center."70
Despite the lack of any real harm from the speech, the appeals court
affirmed her conviction for trespass. 71 The court purported to apply a
balancing test taken from Washington's leading shopping mall case, Al-
derwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council.72 An asserted
constitutional right of access depended upon three factors:
"The first is the use and nature of the private property. As prop-
erty becomes the functional equivalent of a downtown area or
other public forum, reasonable speech activities become less of an
intrusion on the owner's autonomy interests. When property is
held open to the public, the owner has a reduced expectation of
privacy and, as a corollary, any speech activity is less threatening
to the property's value." The second factor for the court to con-
sider is the nature of the speech activity. The third factor is
whether the potential exists for reasonable regulation of the speech.
Some speech activity may be so unreasonable that it violates the
property owner's First Amendment right not to participate in the
dissemination of an idealogical message or it may amount to an
uncompensated taking of private property.73
70. Id. at 800, 751 P.2d at 321.
71. Id. at 787, 751 P.2d at 314.
72. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 244, 635 P.2d 108, 116 (1981) (plurality stated that article 1, § 5 of
the Washington Constitution does not require state action).
73. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. at 791-92, 751 P.2d at 317 (quoting Aldern ood, 96 Wash. 2d at
244-45, 635 P.2d at 116). The explanation of the first factor may not be entirely logical. Alder-
wood states that when property is held open to the pu.blic, "any speech activity is less threaten-
ing to the property's value." Lopez, 50 Wash. App. at 791, 751 P.2d at 317 (quoting
Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116). In most cases the exact opposite is true.
When private property is held open to the public, it is invariably with the expectation that the
owner will profit by selling something to the public. Since obnoxious speech probably induces
some shoppers to avoid commercial premises, or to patronize a competitor, this type of prop-
erty could be the most vulnerable to loss from unregulated speech activity, not the least. Other
property not used for retail purposes, like an office building, cannot be so easily avoided by
those with business inside, and therefore the purposes of the property might be unimpaired by
expression in and around it.
As to factor number three, the owner might, of course, also have a state-based, "article I,
§ 5" right not to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message; the use of "First
Amendment" to describe all speech type rights generically probably is reflexive.
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But of these three, the first "factor" alone-use and nature of the
property-was adequate to overcome any constitutional right of access to
the medical center. The center was, the court said, unlike a shopping
mall in that it was not a successor to a traditional public forum; it was
not open generally to the public, but only to patients, and prohibition of
access would not curtail the realistic opportunity of citizens to exercise
their right of free speech elsewhere.74 To the extent that the public was
invited to enter, the court likened the premises to the "modest retail es-
tablishment" that California's Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center75 de-
cision suggested would not require access.76 The court concluded that it
did not have to reach the last two of the three factors, but could affirm
the conviction based only on the first factor, nature and use of the prop-
erty as "private."
77
In a New Jersey trial court case, Bellemead Development Corp. v.
Schneider,78 the rights claimant was a-union organizer who wished to
distribute organizing literature on private sidewalks in front of office
buildings to the office workers employed there. New Jersey's test for
such cases comes from the celebrated Princeton University case-State v.
Schmid.79 The Schneider court characterized Schmid as a "sliding scale"
standard"0 composed of three slightly different factors: "(1) the nature,
purposes, and primary use of such private property, generally, its 'nor-
mal' use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that
property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon such property in relation to both the private and public use of the
property."'" After addressing all three factors, the Schneider court ruled
that organizers could be barred from entering the grounds of the office
complex.8 2 It reasoned that factor number two-here, there was no invi-
tation to the public to enter-was more important than any other.
The opinion is full of interesting tensions. The court conceded that,
concerning factor number three, there was a near perfect relation be-
tween the use of the property and the purpose of the expression.8 3 The
purpose was to reach workers and the use of the property included the
employment of workers. Plainly, the protestations of the building
74. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. at 794, 751 P.2d at 318.
75. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 477 U.S. 74 (1980).
76. 50 Wash. App. at 794, 751 P.2d at 318.
77. Id.
78. 193 N.J. Super. 85, 472 A.2d 170 (1983).
79. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
80. 193 N.J. Super. at 92, 472 A.2d at 174.
81. 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
82. 193 N.J. Super. at 100, 472 A.2d at 178.
83. Id at 98, 472 A.2d at 177.
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owner-that it was not in his tenants' interests to have unionized em-
ployees-were not supposed to be conclusive. The owner's desires could
not be the measure of the free speech right, for "Schmid directs this court
to look to whether the expressional activities are discordant with the use
of the property and not whether they are discordant with the owner's
desires or interests." 84 Nevertheless, the owner ultimately won because
"the normal use of the property is private and... there is no invitation
by plaintiffs to the public to enter upon and use the property .... ""
Characterizing the reasoning as balancing is difficult because one
consideration, the "invitation" factor, was conclusive. The court even
came close to openly rejecting balancing altogether. The court stated:
The Schmid court did not advise as to the weight to be given each
of the three factors. The court will issue an injunction, not because
more factors weigh in favor of plaintiffs, but because the court finds
that factor number two is the most important as expressing the
constitutional policy ... and because, overall, the properties are
found to be private in nature.86
The Washington and New Jersey opinions probably are wrong,87
but they are at least fairly clear. The third opinion, from the California
court of appeal, might be correct in barring certain kinds of free speech
activity in a shopping center, but it cites so many reasons that its reason-
ing is difficult to ascertain. In Horton Plaza Associates v. Playing For
Real Theatre,8 the California Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled
against a group of political demonstrators whose protest against United
States policies in Central America took the form of skits. The group was
allowed to distribute literature within a shopping center in San Diego,
but enjoined from any other expressive activity because (1) distributing
literature was an alternative means of presenting their views, (2) the
protesters had not proved that the premises were large enough to accom-
modate both plays and shoppers, (3) the protesters had alternative fo-
rums in a nearby park, and (4) the plaza was downtown instead of in the
suburbs.
8 9
If these three opinions are typical of future progeny of the shopping
mall precedents, few commercial property owners, let alone residential
ones, have anything to fear from state constitutions. Certainly this is
true if they do not issue general invitations to the public to enter their
84. Id. 472 A.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
85. Id. 472 A.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 98-99, 472 A.2d at 177.
87. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
88. 184 Cal. App. 3d 10, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986).
89. Id. at 827.
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premises. Results aside, these opinions show little evidence of balancing.
The Washington anti-abortion case and the New Jersey labor organizing
case seem to rest on little more than the rationale that because the own-
ers did not invite the public to enter, the public could not enter for
speech purposes.90 While the lack of an invitation to the public surely is
relevant when the entire public seeks to enter, that observation hardly
should dispose of the rights of particular members of the public whose
purposes for entering are both nondisruptive and highly related to the
use of the property. The rationales of Lopez and Schneider effectively
negate the state constitutional right whenever the use of the property
does not happen to require a large number of customers. This might
mean that the right is enforceable only against huge retail shopping cen-
ters, and even then not against all of them.
Both opinions contain the seeds of what could be a different way to
evaluate whether the proposed speech activity is in fact incompatible with
the use of the property, including the owner's legitimate expectation of
profit and other satisfactions from ownership, such as service to patients.
At a minimum, the speaker's constitutional interest could be accommo-
dated when the financial cost to the defendant is low, and the defendant
has no competing constitutional interest of her own. In the Washington
case, for example, the record did not contain any evidence tending to
show that Ms. Lopez's actions had induced patients to avoid this doctor
in favor of another, or to forego medical consultation, or that patients'
physical or mental well-being were at all affected. The dissenting judge
found the absence of financial impact on the medical center significant.9
That sort of evidence would have been highly persuasive if the test were
the compatibility of her entry with the owner's and users' legitimate ex-
pectations. But the majority did not find such evidence interesting. It
allowed the case to turn solely on a fact within the owner's exclusive
control: the degree to which he had invited the public to enter the prem-
ises. In the New Jersey case, on the other hand, compatibility of uses is
declared to be part of the test used, and the court makes an explicit find-
ing that the proposed expressive activity was compatible with the use of
the property; but that fact availed the organizers and employees not at
all, since they had not been invited for this purpose.
92
90. E.g., Bellemead Dev. Corp. v. Schneider, 193 N.J. Super 85, 99, 472 A.2d 170, 177
(1983) ("Plaintiffs have not opened their premises for public use ... ; therefore, defendants
herein have no right to enter the subject property to distribute leaflets.").
91. City of Sunnyside v. Lopez, 50 Wash. App. 786, 800, 751 P.2d 313, 321 (1988).
92. Schneider, 193 N.J. Super. at 100, 472 A.2d at 178.
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A standard that starts with the incompatibility of speech with com-
peting interests also makes sense in employment disputes. In a wrongful
discharge case brought under the Texas free speech clause, an intensive
care nurse filed suit when she was fired after she published an article
about tensions between the duty of health workers to preserve life and a
patient's "right to die" with dignity.9 3 The nurse's case might have been
decided by asking what job functions and professional standards the
nurse had reasonably undertaken to perform and whether publishing an
article on this subject was incompatible with carrying out those func-
tions.94 Asserting that her job description included a duty of silence,
conformity, or loyalty was not sufficient. Hospital counsel should have
investigated whether publication of the article harmed the emotional or
physical well-being of anyone to whom the nurse owed a responsibility.
At a minimum, the court should have required evidence about who was
disturbed by reading the article (patients or their families, or only doc-
tors or hospital administrators?) and whether her views ever affected her
actual willingness to carry out orders. In speech cases the determination
of incompatibility can be difficult. In others it can be fairly simple. No
legitimate property interest of an employer normally is advanced when
the employer hires or fires because of the employee's gender or race, for
example. Such action would exemplify the use of power for its own sake,
a use incompatible with the simultaneous advancement of the sister value
of liberty.
Conclusion
The choice to apply constitutional rights to private conduct finds
support in text and precedent and is a task less daunting than it may
93. Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 746 S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). This
recent opinion affirmed that article 1, § 8 of the Texas Constitution supplied an independent
legal basis for a cause of action, but did not address the merits.
94. One state free speech case making "incompatibility" the focus in an employment re-
lated dispute is the Oregon Supreme Court opinion in a bar disciplinary case, In re Lasswell,
296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983). A disciplinary rule, aimed at promoting fair criminal trials,
forbade prosecutors from making public statements regarding the arrest or prosecution of sus-
pects. A prosecuting attorney was accused of violating the rule by issuing certain statements
to the press. The court described the standard as follows:
[T]he rule addresses the incompatibility between a prosecutor's official function, in-
cluding his responsibility to preserve the conditions for a fair trial, and speech that,
though privileged against other than professional sanctions, vitiates the proper per-
formance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case. In short, a
lawyer is not denied the freedom to speak, write, or publish; but when one exercises
official responsibility for conducting a prosecution according to constitutional stan-
dards, one also undertakes the professional responsibility to protect those standards
in what he or she says or writes.
Id. at 125, 673 P.2d at 857.
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appear. California's case law in this area has been innovative, but hardly
radical. Privacy clearly is established as a constitutional right, regardless
of the status or identity of the privacy invader. Employment decisions by
some private employers must comport with equal protection, and use of
the right to petition the government cannot be made the occasion for
some types of private coercion. Access to private property for political
activity under article 1, section 2 is well established as a general rule, but
has not really expanded in ten years, and is subject to uncertain excep-
tions and distinctions. If the judiciary were so inclined, this line of cases
easily could be confined to large retail establishments. That would be an
unfortunate closing of a window in constitutional doctrine that Califor-
nia opened with such flair ten years ago.
On the other hand, constitutional actions against private actors
could continue to provide an avenue for decision of grievances now going
completely unredressed. For common sensical and economic reasons, a
large fraction of privacy, equality, and speech claims likely would involve
defendants such as employers, landlords, labor unions, private schools,
and government contractors that are in a position to inflict significant
losses on employees, tenants, or students. The net result could be an
increase in the power of the individual in situations in which, because of
disparities in economic power, negotiation for such rights is unlikely.
Whether that would represent a net gain for California society is a topic
California courts increasingly will be invited to discuss.
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